The Effects of Liberalization and Deregulation on the Performance of Financial Institutions: The Case of the German Life Insurance Market by Lucinda Trigo Gamarra
Thünen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 
Thünen-Reihe Angewandter Volkswirtschaftstheorie 
 
 




The Effects of Liberalization and Deregulation on the 
Performance of Financial Institutions: The Case of the German 
Life Insurance Market 
 
by 







Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät 
Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre 
2008 2 
 
The Effects of Liberalization and Deregulation on the Performance of Financial 
Institutions: The Case of the German Life Insurance Market 
Lucinda Trigo Gamarra
* 
This version: July 2008 
 
Abstract 
The German insurance market was liberalized in 1994 by the introduction of the ‘single 
passport’ allowing European insurers to operate throughout the entire European Union. The 
European directive put also an end to price and insurance contract terms regulation. These 
measures were meant for removing the obstacles to competition within and between the 
insurance markets of the member states aiming at an increased efficiency of the European 
insurance markets. We analyze to which extent this aim has been achieved in the German life 
insurance market. The development of market performance is measured by changes in 
technical cost and profit efficiency levels since the liberalization, as well as a measurement of 
technological change. Technical cost efficiency levels are estimated by applying a stochastic 
“true” fixed effects distance frontier (Greene, 2005). Non-standard profit efficiency is derived 
in a second step following Kumbakhar (2006). According to our results, the industry 
experienced positive total factor productivity (TFP) growth during the observation period, 
which is mainly driven by substantial positive technological change. Technical cost efficiency 
and profit efficiency remained stable on average, but significant positive scale efficiency 
change can be found indicating that market consolidation in the presence of increasing returns 
to scale led to efficiency gains of the firms.  
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In 1994, European life insurance markets were liberalized by the Third Life Insurance 
Directive. Since then, insurance firms have been able to operate freely throughout the member 
states, either by establishing their own branches and agencies throughout the European Union, 
or by direct cross-border trade. Market consolidation has increased as a consequence of 
intense (cross-border) M&A activities, and the main part of the existing product and price 
regulations were abolished. By this, the European Union aims to enhance the efficiency of the 
national insurance markets through increased competition and consolidation. As a result, 
insurance customers should benefit from an increased product variety at more competitive 
prices. 
As a consequence of the Third Life Insurance Directive, the German insurance market has 
undergone major changes in the past decade. Before European market liberalization, the 
market was characterized by severe price and product regulation, which allowed inefficient 
insurers to stay in the market. Competition was also highly limited because of regulations that 
restricted foreign insurance firms’ access to the market. The stepwise liberalization of the 
market which resulted in a changed regulatory regime and an increased level of competition 
was accompanied by two other factors that have strongly affected the insurance environment. 
First, technological progress in information technologies has led to considerable changes in 
internal administrative and communication processes and has strongly influenced the structure 
and choice of distribution channels in most insurance firms. Most significantly, electronic 
distribution channels have simplified direct contact with the customer without the 
involvement of intermediaries. Second, changes in the statutory pension systems have 
resulted in increased demand for private and occupational old-age provision. This 
development is backed by state-run promotion of certain old-age provision products, with life 
insurance firms facing strong competition by banks in this field.  
This study analyzes whether the aims of the liberalization process have been achieved in 
the German life insurance market, i.e., whether increased competition as a consequence of the 
liberalization has resulted in better market performance. To accomplish this analysis, we 
analyze possible effects of the liberalization process on market performance by applying the 
revised SCP paradigm. The traditional SCP paradigm addresses the relationship between 
market structure and performance via the conduct of the firms in an industry (e.g., Mason, 
1949, and Bain, 1951). The revised SCP paradigm also accounts for possible feedback effects 
of market performance on the structure and conduct of firms (e.g., Demsetz, 1973) so, in this 4 
 
study, it is used to analyze the effects of liberalization and the corresponding changes in the 
regulatory regime. Market performance is analyzed by measuring the total factor productivity 
(TFP) change of the industry, which is composed of technical change and changes in 
(technical) cost and scale efficiency. We also measure profit efficiency change in the industry 
after market liberalization. 
If market liberalization has been successful, cost and profit efficiency will have increased 
as competition forces firms to reduce costs and to realize unused profit potentials. An increase 
in profit efficiency might also result from firms’ undertaking innovations in services and 
products which raise costs but also lead to higher prices and profits, even though cost 
efficiency decreases. Increased competition may also induce firms to exploit formerly unused 
scale economies by moving to the most productive production size, i.e., the point of minimum 
average costs. It is also important to analyze changes in scale efficiency, as an increased scale 
efficiency and market consolidation may reduce competition. Thus, in a second step, cost and 
profit efficiency might decrease as a feedback effect. Finally, an analysis of market 
performance would not be complete without taking into account technical change; it is 
expected that increased competition provides incentives for firms to adopt new technologies 
and increase productivity, so we expect positive technical change in the industry. This is 
supported by a technology-pull effect resulting from important innovations in information 
technologies. Analysis of both the effects of efficiency and technical change provides 
evidence of the main drivers of TFP growth after market liberalization. 
Previous evidence from the German industry is limited. Hussels and Ward (2004) analyzed 
cost efficiency and technical change using a small sample of German life insurance firms over 
the period 1991-2002, applying a non-parametric Malmquist DEA analysis to a randomly 
chosen, balanced panel of 31 German life insurers which persisted in the industry over the 
entire period. However, they neglected the possible effects of firms which entered or exited 
the market as a consequence of the liberalization of the market. In addition, the random choice 
of insurance firms in the sample may have resulted in biased data. Mahlberg and Url (2007) 
conducted a non-parametric Malmquist DEA for the whole German insurance industry using 
a balanced panel containing only firms which remained in the sample over the whole 
observation period 1991-2002. 
Our data set contains information about the German life insurance industry for the years 
1995-2002. We use an unbalanced panel in order to account for possible effects on market 
performance resulting from firms’ entering or exiting the market during the observation 
period and extend the research by incorporating profit efficiency change into the analysis, 5 
 
which has not been done by previous studies. It is important to account for changes in profit 
efficiency, in addition to changes in cost efficiency, because, as a consequence of the 
liberalization process, life insurance firms have innovated by creating new products and 
services. These innovations may raise costs, but they may also lead to increased revenues. In 
contrast to cost efficiency measurement, which takes only the cost side into account, profit 
efficiency measurement also considers firms’ revenues and, thus, allows a more complete 
analysis of changes in market performance (e.g., Berger and Mester, 2003). Thus, this paper 
provides new and extended evidence on the effects of liberalization in the German life 
insurance industry. 
To obtain measures of cost efficiency, scale efficiency, and technical change, we use a 
stochastic distance frontier panel approach recently developed by Greene (2005) to 
disentangle inefficiency and firm-specific heterogeneity. Profit efficiency is derived by 
applying a novel approach developed by Kumbakhar (2006), which accounts for possible 
price-setting power of the firms. In contrast to the standard profit function, where firms take 
output prices as given, the non-standard profit function takes account of the increasing 
product competition in the market that may enable firms temporarily to achieve price-setting 
power.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of past and present 
regulation of the German life insurance market. Section 3 derives the hypotheses to be tested 
in the study and gives an overview of previous evidence on the effects of market liberalization 
and deregulation on insurance markets. Section 4 presents the methodology. The data set and 
the chosen variables are described in section 5. Section 6 presents the results of the stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA), and the measurement of changes in TFP growth and efficiency, and 
section 7 concludes the study. 6 
 
2 The Regulatory Regime in the German Life Insurance Industry 
Before the liberalization of the European insurance markets in 1994, the German 
regulatory concept encompassed all elements of the supervisory system which prevailed in the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Ireland, but extended the regulation to a prior approval 
system in which every tariff and every product had to be accepted before the insurance firm 
could conduct its business (e.g., Everson, 1996). The entry of a new insurance firm into the 
market was subject to various requirements. In addition, contract conditions were largely 
harmonized, as new contract types had to be submitted to the regulatory agency, and some 
contract elements were standardized. Price competition was highly restricted, as premiums 
were regulated according to a cost-plus price regulation. Based on a standardized calculation 
of expected loss common for all insurers, insurers could calculate their premiums by adding 
to them an amount unique to themselves that depended on the insurer’s costs.  
As a consequence of the prescribed minimum price levels, German life insurers pursued a 
revenue-maximizing, rather than a profit-maximizing objective, focusing on increasing their 
sales strength to maximize their turnover. Because price competition was restricted, insurance 
firms competed for new business by increasing selling and advertising costs and based 
competition mainly on service (e.g., Hess and Trauth, 1998; Rees and Kessner, 1999). Thus, 
German life insurers engaged heavily in selling activities by large, exclusive sales forces, the 
most important distribution channel in life insurance, keeping independent agents and direct 
sale to a minor role. Commissions paid to agents were restricted to 11 percent of the 
premiums, and total marketing expenditures could not exceed 30 percent of total premiums. 
Finally, German life insurers were also profit-regulated, as 90 percent of any amount of 
insurers’ profits which exceeded 3 percent of premium income had to be redistributed to 
policyholders and shareholders (e.g., Rees and Kessner, 1999). Thus, ex post price 
competition was possible but, from the customers’ point of view, it was difficult to obtain a 
market overview over rebates. For their part, German life insurers were limited in their 
investment activities and in the types and amounts of assets they could hold; as a 
consequence, insurers held a substantial amount of fixed-interest assets.  
The European Union aims at the establishment of a Single Market for Financial Services 
because integrating Europe’s financial markets should foster competition between financial 
firms and lead to higher efficiency in these markets, and customers should benefit from an 
increasing variety of financial products at more competitive prices (e.g., Hogan, 1995). The 
Third Directive on Life Insurance (92/96/EEC) (ECC, 1992) completed the freedom of 7 
 
establishment and services. Life insurance firms need only a single license, issued by the 
regulatory agency of their home country, to operate throughout the European Union, either 
under the principles of freedom of establishment or under the principle of freedom of 
services. However, if a subsidiary is established in a foreign country, the host country 
principle remains. Finally, the principle of minimum harmonization was established, requiring 
insurance firms to meet the minimum principles established in the Third Directive. The 
national regulatory agency is free to impose more stringent standards on its domestic 
insurance firms, but foreign insurers must be allowed to conduct their business according to 
the minimum principles (e.g., Hogan, 1995). The directive abolished price and product 
regulation in those member countries where these elements of material regulation still existed 
(e.g., Germany) and made price competition possible, as minimum price levels were no 
longer prescribed (Schmidt, 2002). The Third Directive also removed restrictions on 
distribution and marketing expenditures. 
Despite the liberalization process, which was completed by the Third European Directives, 
the insurance business in Germany is still limited, to an extent, by the remaining regulatory 
requirements regarding the amount of technical liability and solvency capital. To date, it 
remains the main objective of insurance regulation to provide the insurance company with a 
high level of credibility as a firm able to meet its actual and future (contingent) obligations by 
reducing the insolvency risk of an insurance firm.  
To sum up, the regulation and supervision of German life insurance firms has changed 
from a very strict material regulation before 1994 to a very detailed but less intrusive 
regulation centering on the supervision of insurance firms and preventing insurers’ 
insolvency. The next section describes how these changes in regulatory regime together with 
the liberalization of the market may affect the industry’s structure, firms’ conduct and market 
performance. 8 
 
3 Theoretical Background and Previous Evidence 
In this section, the regulatory changes connected with the liberalization of the European 
insurance markets are analyzed within the framework of the SCP paradigm (e.g., Mason, 
1949; Bain, 1951). The revised SCP paradigm takes account of the fact that all variables are 
endogenous as a result of interactions between market structure, conduct, and performance 
(e.g., Demsetz, 1973).
 In section 3.1, the paradigm is applied to insurance markets to describe 
and analyze the possible effects of changed regulations on the structure, the conduct, and 
particularly the performance of the German life insurance market. Section 3.2 derives our 
hypotheses concerning the evolution of cost and profit efficiency in the market, as well as 
changes in technical and scale efficiency. Section 3.3 gives an overview of existing literature 
on the effects of market liberalization on insurance markets.  
3.1 Effects of Liberalization and Deregulation within the (Revised) SCP-Paradigm 
The traditional SCP paradigm addresses the relationship between market structure and 
performance via the conduct of the firms in an industry, where the performance of a market 
depends on the conduct of the market participants. Conduct, in turn, depends on the market 
structure, which is affected by the basic conditions of the industry and the prevailing public 
policy regime. The SCP paradigm can be used to analyze the effects of liberalization and the 
corresponding changes in the regulatory regime on market performance in the German life 
insurance industry. Possible feedback effects of market performance on the structure and 
conduct of firms are accounted for by the revised SCP paradigm. Figure 1 presents the 
structure of the revised SCP paradigm for the German life insurance market.
1 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Public policy includes the main actions of the liberalization process in the German market: 
implementation of the principles of freedom of services and establishment and the abolition of 
price and product regulation. The basic conditions of the market changed during the period of 
interest for this study (1995-2002), particularly because important technological changes 
occurred in the field of information technology, which led to changed supply and demand 
conditions in insurance markets (e.g., Cummins et al., 1999). Insurance firms implemented 
new technologies for pricing, underwriting, policyholder services and distribution. Operating 
                                                 
1 Only those aspects relevant to this study have been included in the SCP framework in figure 4.1. Thus, the 
figure makes no claim to be complete but serves as a guideline for the following analysis. For a more detailed 
description of the revised SCP paradigm, see, e.g., Schwalbach (1994). For an application to banking markets, 
see Neuberger (1998). 9 
 
procedures and the communication channels within the company also changed as a 
consequence of technical change in information technologies (e.g., Köhne and Kopp, 2007). 
On the demand side, because of the internet, customers became increasingly able to inform 
themselves about insurance products and to purchase their products online.  
Another basic condition which influences the demand side is that insurance markets are 
characterized by large information asymmetries and high complexity, so insurance customers 
face difficulties in assessing the content and quality of insurance products and the financial 
stability and solvency of insurers.
2 These information asymmetries are of special importance 
in life insurance markets, as most life insurance products are both highly complex and long-
term (e.g., Finsinger et al., 1985). As a consequence, trust and reputation of firms play an 
important role in insurance markets, and customers often prefer to purchase their products 
from established, well known suppliers (e.g., Beckmann et al., 2002). The high information 
asymmetries also help to explain the importance of distribution channel choice for insurance 
firms: In most cases, especially for long-term and complex life insurance products, insurance 
services are still provided by intermediaries (insurance agents or brokers) who help the 
customer to assess and choose suitable products. The supply and the demand side of life 
insurance products have also been affected by changes in the statutory pension systems, and 
by newly created opportunities for employees to contribute to pension plans (e.g., Maurer and 
Somova, 2007).  
Market liberalization has had an important effect on the market structure. First, the size of 
the market has changed as a consequence of the establishment of freedom of services and 
establishment. German life insurers now face potential competition from the whole European 
market, although competition by foreign insurers occurs mainly via M&A activities and only 
to a lesser extent via direct cross-border trade or the establishment of agencies (Beckmann et 
al., 2002). Farny (2002) pointed out that M&A activities by foreign insurers are not a direct 
consequence of market liberalization, as they were already possible before 1994; however, 
these activities have certainly increased since then.  
Second, entry barriers to the market may have decreased because technological progress in 
information technology has eliminated the need for a large sales force and eased market entry 
for new direct insurers which offer their products exclusively via the internet. Still, certain 
barriers to entry persist because of remaining differences in regulation (e.g., differing tax 
                                                 
2 The information asymmetries in insurance markets are two-sided, as insurance firms also face difficulties in 
evaluating the individual risk of potential insurance customers (e.g., Finsinger et al., 1985). Though, possible 
information asymmetries to the burden of the insurer are not in the focus of this study, and are not further 
considered in the following. 10 
 
regimes) and the large, exclusive sales forces still common in the German life insurance 
market. These may represent a barrier to entry to foreign insurers, as building up an own sales 
force would be very costly (e.g., Regan and Tennyson, 2000). Further barriers to entry may be 
due to economies of scale or reputation (or lack thereof). For example, the actual market share 
via direct distribution in life insurance markets remains small despite of technological 
progress. The overall effect is that potential competition has increased as a consequence of 
market liberalization, but that effect is still limited because of customer loyalty to domestic, 
well established insurers and because of the large sales forces of domestic insurance firms 
(e.g., van den Berghe, 2001; Schmidt, 2002). 
Third, cost structures have changed because technological changes allow insurance 
services to be provided at lower costs and because the abolition of price regulation provides 
incentives for insurance firms to minimize their costs (Rees and Kessner, 1999). The market 
after liberalization is also characterized by increased product differentiation, since the 
abolition of ex ante product approvals has made room for an increasing variety of life 
insurance products. This development is supported by an increasing demand for private and 
occupational old-age provision and by new insurance products offering private old-age 
provision. In the German market, the so-called Riester pension reform (established in 2002) 
and the Rürup pension plans (established in 2004) are thought to encourage private old-age 
provisions by enabling individuals to invest part of their income into individual pension 
accounts. The investment occurs on a pretax basis and is subsidized by the government. (For 
more details, see Maurer and Somova, 2007.) 
As a consequence, market conduct has also been affected. The abolition of price regulation 
may have increased price competition in certain insurance lines, particularly standardized life 
insurance products, like term life insurance. Since price competition is more likely in 
standardized, less complex insurance lines, insurance customers are better able to compare 
prices, and direct insurers work to attract customers with lower premiums. On the other hand, 
quality variables may also influence competition in a liberalized market as insurers introduce 
new products or innovate on existing products or services to improve their own market 
position.  
A final part of market structure is the possible scale effects resulting from increased M&A 
activities in a liberalized market. Insurance firms are likely to realize increasing economies of 
scale because they have relatively large fixed costs from investments in computer systems and 
financial capital, and because the industry operates on the basis of the law of large numbers. 
The larger the policy portfolio of similar risks, the better the insurance firm’s ability to assess 11 
 
the risks and the lower the risk volatility (e.g., Cummins and Rubio-Misas, 2006). The 
establishment of the single market was expected to lead to increasing M&A activities from 
intensified competition and the possible realization of scale economies (e.g., Hogan, 1995). 
This process may be enforced by increasing integration of the European insurance markets. 
Foreign life insurers most often rely on M&A activities to enter new markets, while the 
establishment of branches or agencies, as well as the direct cross-border trade, is much more 
infrequent (Beckmann et al., 2002). The realization of economies of scale would result in an 
increased scale efficiency, but M&A activities may also bring high coordination and 
adjustment costs, including difficulties in integrating data-processing systems (Rhoades, 
1998) and product portfolios (Diacon et al., 2005). High costs may also arise as a 
consequence of the coordination of the different distribution systems after a merger or 
acquisition.  
The possible effects of these presented variables on market performance, i.e. on the 
performance of the German life insurance industry, lead to the hypotheses to be tested in our 
study. We also take into account possible feedback effects of changes in market performance 
on the other variables. The development of the market performance of an industry may be 
analyzed by changes in the levels of cost, scale and profit efficiency. Cost efficiency describes 
a firm’s ability to produce a given output at minimum costs, whereas scale efficiency 
describes how far away a firm operates from its optimal size, i.e., from the production size 
where minimum average costs are reached. Profit efficiency encompasses firms’ revenues and 
describes the relationship of actual to potential firm profits. An industry’s market 
performance may also be analyzed by the measure of technical change, which turns positive if 
an improvement in technology occurs which alters the production function, i.e. if 
technological changes allow the industry to produce a given output with a smaller amount of 
inputs (e.g., Färe et al., 2008). Changes in cost efficiency, technical change, and scale 
efficiency combine and lead to TFP growth (e.g., Coelli et al., 2003).
3  
3.2 Hypotheses 
According to the above analysis, market liberalization has induced changes in market 
structure, and correspondingly, in firms’ conduct, which affects market performance. If the 
aimed effects of liberalization are fulfilled, the increase in potential competition should lead 
to higher efficiency levels among the firms in the industry (e.g., Rees and Kessner, 1999).  
                                                 
3 A detailed and formal analysis of these concepts can be found in section 4. 12 
 
We analyze cost efficiency change, as increased competition may force firms to minimize 
costs: inefficient insurers have a strong incentive to improve their efficiency; otherwise, they 
would be forced to leave the market (e.g., Cummins, 2002). Insurance firms aim at realizing 
cost reductions by internal reorganizations, the reduction of overhead costs, and the 
restructuring of distribution channels (Muth, 1993). Hess and Trauth (1998) also point out 
that the liberalization of services and establishment throughout Europe allows insurance firms 
to better diversify their risks and by this, to lower costs.  
However, increased competition may also force firms to realize potential profits, either by 
competing through prices or quality of services (e.g., Kumbakhar et al., 2001; Weiss and 
Choi, 2008). Hence, we additionally take into account profit efficiency, which measures the 
ratio of actual to potential profits. If the aims of the liberalization process have already been 
achieved, profit efficiency change in the industry should also be positive. As has been 
explained in section 2, the German life insurance market before market liberalization was 
characterized by price and product regulation leading to excessive sales activities (e.g., 
Finsinger et al., 1985). The existing cost-plus price regulation set inventives for firms to 
inflate costs and to maximize revenues, thus firms were not induced to act profit efficient. In 
contrast to that, firms now are induced to maximize profits.  
It is important to measure profit efficiency besides cost efficiency due to the following: 
The introduction of new insurance products and additional services by firms may raise 
customers’ willingness to pay, enabling innovative insurance firms to charge higher prices 
and realize higher profits. However, the introduction of these innovations may raise firms’ 
costs, and consequently, lower their cost efficiency (e.g., Berger and Mester, 2003). Increases 
in cost levels may be caused by the implementation of new technologies, additional services, 
and changed distribution structures. Distribution structures have undergone major 
restructuring in the German life insurance market, which heavily relied on exclusive sales 
forces before its liberalization. Most multi-channel insurance firms, which represent over 80 
percent of all life insurers, have added additional distribution channels like independent 
brokers, direct channels and sales via bank branches, reducing their own sales forces at the 
same time. Thus, an exclusive analysis of cost efficiency change might lead to misleading 
results, disregarding the possibility that an increase in costs may be accompanied by 
increasing revenues, resulting in an overall positive effect on profit efficiency. An ongoing 
process of innovations may explain why these higher profits are not competed away. Though 
extraordinary innovation profits are competed away over time, subsequent innovations permit 
the anew realization of innovation rents (Berger and Mester, 2003). Boone (2001) further 13 
 
showed in a formal model that increasing competition in an industry may set incentives for 
the firms to innovate. If above all the market leaders innovate, they may increase their market 
share further by innovating, leading to an increased market power of the industry leaders and 
an increased concentration in the industry. Thus, as a consequence of increased competition, 
prices and profits in the industry may rise. Finally, eased investment rules may lead to 
increased investment income of insurers after the liberalization of the market (e.g., Rees and 
Kessner, 1999).  
Summarizing, the following main hypotheses should hold if the liberalization of the market 
has enhanced competition and thus, increased efficiency: 
H 1:  Cost and profit efficiency in the German life insurance industry increased during the 
observation period. 
However, as has been explained, service and product innovations may have raised costs, 
although to a lesser extent than revenues have increased. Thus, we additionally formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
H  2:  Cost efficiency decreased, and profit efficiency increased during the observation 
period. 
We now turn to possible scale effects: As has already been explained, market liberalization 
followed by increased competition in the German life insurance market may foster the 
exploitation of economies of scale by a growing firm size, mainly by M&A activites. 
Especially less profitable insurance firms which used to be protected by the former regulatory 
regime may become M&A targets. Thus, we derive the following hypothesis: 
H 3:  Scale efficiency in the German life insurance industry increased during the observation 
period. 
Finally, we analyze technical change: As has been argued, technological changes in the 
information technologies have had a major influence on the supply of insurance services. In 
the long run, technical progress in the information technology should have a positive effect on 
technological change in the life insurance industry. This development may be reinforced by 
the liberalization of the market, as increased competition increases incentives for firms to 
improve productivity and innovate (e.g., Cummins et al., 1999; Cummins, 2002).  
H 4:  Technical change has been positive. 14 
 
3.3 Previous Evidence 
An overview of existing studies which analyze the effects of regulatory changes and market 
liberalization on insurance markets reveals only two extant studies which analyze the effects 
of market liberalization on the German insurance market. 
Hussels and Ward (2004) analyzed changes in cost efficiency and TFP growth in the 
German life insurance industry for the years 1991-2002. They concluded that the expected 
gains in efficiency were not achieved; a TFP growth of 2.6 percent occurred in the industry, 
but the observed time span included both years of productivity increases and years of 
productivity decreases. Mahlberg and Url (2007) examined the development of the German 
insurance industry for the years 1991-2001, using DEA and Malmquist analysis. They found 
that TFP increased during the observation period, although the liberalization process did not 
lead to converging efficiency scores. The authors futher reported important improvements in 
scale efficiency and less pronounced gains in technical and cost efficiency. 
Several other studies conducted similar analyses for other European countries. Hardwick 
(1997) examined the effects of market liberalization on the development of the UK life 
insurance industry by employing a stochastic cost frontier approach. He found evidence for 
increasing returns to scale and significant cost inefficiencies and concluded that large and 
inefficient insurers are most likely to benefit from the European Single Market. Fuentes et al. 
(2001) employed a parametric distance function approach to estimate a Malmquist 
productivity index for Spanish insurance companies from 1987-1994. The authors found a 
very low rate of growth in productivity and that technical efficiency did not improve as a 
consequence of market deregulation. Diacon et al. (2002) focused on European specialist and 
composite insurers for the years 1996-1999. Employing non-parametric DEA, the authors 
found evidence for declining technical efficiency over time, which they attributed to high 
costs incurred in the restructuring and M&A processes. 
Campbell et al. (2003) examined the impact of the Second and Third Life and Non-Life 
Directives on the stock returns of insurance firms in 14 European Union countries, plus 
Norway, and Switzerland. They found positive effects on wealth for European life insurance 
firms, the highest effects of which were in formerly highly regulated countries. Ennsfellner et 
al. (2004) employed Bayesian SFA to analyze the productive efficiency of the Austrian 
insurance industry for the years 1994-1999 and found evidence for an increase in productive 
efficiency over time, which they attributed to market deregulation. Cummins and Rubio-
Misas (2006) analyzed the effects of deregulation and market consolidation for the Spanish 15 
 
insurance market from 1989-1998. Using non-parametric DEA and Malmquist analysis, and 
paying special attention to M&A activities in this market, they found significant TFP growth, 
which was due primarily to an increase in cost efficiency among Spanish insurance firms. 
Further, Spanish firms experienced efficiency gains as a consequence of liberalization and 
market consolidation. Fenn et al. (2008) employed SFA to analyze the market structure and 
efficiency of European insurance companies between 1995 and 2001 and found evidence of 
increasing returns to scale among European life insurance firms. The authors also found the 
mean cost efficiency for German life insurance firms remained unchanged over time, which 
they explained as the result of M&A activities that annulled the efficiency gains from market 
liberalization. Bikker and Gorter (2008) examined the performance of the Dutch non-life 
insurance industry. The authors estimated a stochastic cost frontier and found that increasing 
economies of scale persisted in the market despite the consolidation process after the 
liberalization of the European markets. They also reported large differences in firms’ cost 
efficiency levels, suggesting that competitive pressure might be insufficient to force insurance 
firms to improve their cost levels. 16 
 
4. Methodology 
This section describes our methodology and the estimation approach we follow to obtain 
technical cost and profit efficiency scores of German life insurers and a measure of TFP 
growth during the observation period. In section 4.1, we introduce the input distance function 
and describe the way it will be constructed in our analysis. Section 4.2 describes our 
estimation methodology, the parametric SFA. In section 4.3, we illustrate how individual 
technical cost and profit efficiency scores for firms may be obtained from the estimation of a 
stochastic input distance frontier. Finally, section 4.4 shows how TFP growth will be 
measured and decomposed in our study. 
4.1 Parametric Input Distance Functions 
In this study, a parametric input distance function, rather than a cost function, is used to 
obtain firm-individual measures of firm’s technical cost efficiency, i.e., measures of the over-
usage of costs by firms.
4 We are able to use an input distance function approach because the 
inputs used in this study represent the relevant cost categories of insurance firms, so the input 
distance function can derive firm-individual efficiency scores which represent cost over-
usage. We have chosen the input distance function approach in this study because direct 
estimation of a cost frontier is not practical since data is limited and there is insufficient 
variation in some of the input prices. In these cases, a distance function approach proves 
superior to the direct estimation of a cost function (Coelli, Singh and Fleming, 2003). 
Although the econometric estimation of distance functions is a fairly recent concept, an 
increasing number of applications can be found in the literature, including some which use 
distance functions for the measurement of TFP growth, as will be done in this study (e.g., 
Atkinson and Primont, 2002; Orea, 2002; Coelli and Rungsuriyawiboon, 2006). Applications 
of the distance function approach to efficiency and TFP growth measurement to the field of 
financial services can be found in Fuentes et al. (2001) and Orea and Cuesta (2002). 
Distance functions, a concept introduced by Shepard (1953), can be differentiated into 
input and output distance functions. While an input distance function characterizes the 
production technology by seeking the minimal proportional contraction of the input vector, 
given an output vector, the output distance function gives information about the maximum 
proportional expansion of the output vector, given an input vector. This study uses an input 
                                                 
4 In the following, the efficiency scores obtained from the estimation of the input distance function are labelled 
technical cost efficiency in order to differentiate this concept of efficiency measurement from the cost efficiency 
estimates obtained from a cost function. 17 
 
distance function because the output of an insurance firm, as measured in this study, is largely 
exogenously determined by the incurred benefits of a firm. (See section 5 for additional 
details.) 
An input distance function which summarizes all economically relevant characteristics of 
the production technology can be defined as:  
)} L(y x (x/ : max{ y) (x, D 0
I ∈ = ρ ρ , (1) 
where the input set L(y) represents the set of all input vectors x that can produce the output 
vector y.  
Färe and Primont (1995) showed that the following properties hold for an input distance 
function: D
I (x,y) is 
−  non-decreasing in x and non-increasing in y 
−  linearly homogeneous in x 
−  concave in x and quasi-concave in y, and, finally, 
−  if x ∈L(y0), then D
I (x,y) ≥ 1, with D
I (x,y) = 1, if x belongs to a firm on the frontier 
of the input set. 
Figure 2 shows an input-oriented distance function for the two-input (x1, x2), one-output 
(y) case. The isoquant shows the frontier of the technology for a given output vector y0. The 
area L(y0) represents all input quantity vectors x which can produce the output quantity vector 
y0. L(y0) is bounded below by the isoquant, which represents the minimum input quantities 
which are necessary to produce a given output vector y0. The value of the distance function at 
B, then, is equal to the ratio ρ = 0B/0Q > 1, as the firm could reduce its input usage and still 
produce the given output vector.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
Thus, we are able to derive a measure of input-oriented technical efficiency in terms of the 
input-distance function. According to Farrell (1957), the efficiency at the production point B 
is measured by 
TE = 0Q/0B = 1/ D
I (x,y), where 0 ≤ TE ≤ 1.   (2) 
Technical efficiency, then, represents the reciprocal of the value of the distance function. A 
fully efficient firm which operates on the frontier obtains an efficiency score of 1, and the 
value of the input distance function also equals 1. In this study, the efficiency scores obtained 18 
 
from the estimation of an input distance function are denoted as technical cost efficiency, as 
all input categories used represent firm’s costs. 
In order to estimate a parametric input distance function, a functional form has to be 
chosen for D
I (x,y). The translog function chosen for this study was introduced by Christensen 
et al. (1973), and represents a generalization of the Cobb-Douglas functional form. Compared 
to the Cobb-Douglas function, the translog function is a second-order flexible form, i.e., it has 
enough parameters to provide a second-order approximation of a Taylor series. By taking the 
logarithm of both sides of the function, the translog function can be estimated in a linear 
framework. Finally, homogeneity is easily imposed, as shown below. 
A translog input distance function is parametrized as follows in the K (k = 1,..., K) input 
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where t represents a time trend to approximate technical change. The subscripts   
i (i = 1,2,…N) and t (t = 1,2,…T) index firm and time period, respectively, while the 
parameters to be estimated are β, γ, δ, φ, κ, and η. 
To ensure that the first-order translog parameters can be directly interpreted as the 
production elasticities at the sample mean, every series is divided by its geometric average, a 
process which does not change the results (e.g., Coelli et al., 2003). Homogeneity of degree 1 
in inputs is imposed by the following constraints: 
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4.2 Estimation Methodology – Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
In this study, a parametric approach is used to derive the “best practice” input distance 
frontier and to measure technical cost efficiency in the German life insurance industry. In 
contrast to non-parametric approaches to efficiency measurement (e.g., DEA), which rely on 
mathematical programming techniques to obtain the “best practice” frontier, the econometric 
approach requires that a functional form of the underlying production function be specified 
and that the “best practice” frontier using econometric methods be estimated. In this study, a 
parametric approach is chosen in order to accommodate the derivation of profit efficiency 19 
 
scores, in keeping with Kumbakhar (2006), who chose a parametric approach for deriving 
profit efficiency measures. 
We employ a panel data model to estimate the stochastic input distance frontier, so that a 
firm’s inputs and outputs vary freely through time and among firms. Recently, Greene (2004a, 
2004b, 2005) suggested two different panel models, the true fixed and random effects models. 
These are intented to account for unobserved heterogeneity, which would otherwise enter the 
inefficiency term and bias the inefficiency estimates. 
In the case of an input distance frontier, the true FE model is modeled as follows: 
-xiK = αi + g[(xi-xiK), yi]+vit-uit, (8) 
where αi represents firm-specific dummies which measure the firm-specific heterogeneity, vit 
follows the standard normal distribution, and uit may follow a half-normal, truncated-normal 
or exponential distribution. 
In this study, we use the true FE model presented in equation (8) for two reasons: First, it 
accounts for unobserved heterogeneity, such that systematic differences between the 
insurance firms are considered by including a firm-specific fixed effect, αi, which accounts for 
firm-specific characteristics not captured by the included variables.
5 Second, efficiency varies 
freely through time. This is in contrast to most of the other models which allow for time-
varying efficiency by assuming a given inefficiency ui for every firm which varies through 
time in a given time path (e.g., Battese and Coelli, 1992) or because of the influence of 
additional variables in the inefficiency term (e.g., Battese and Coelli, 1995). Since this study 
is especially interested in the development of efficiency (and other TFP components) as a 
consequence of market liberalization, we prefer to let efficiency vary freely through time. 
Further, the true effects model allows for cross-firm variation in the efficiency of firms, since 
it is possible that some firms increase their efficiency while others decrease efficiency in a 
given year.  
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5 We conducted a Hausman test to test the assumption of no correlation between the firm-specific random effects 
and the exogeneous variables in the model. The result strongly rejected the assumption of no correlation between 
the variables. Thus, the estimation of a true RE model would not be appropiate in our case, and the true FE 
model was chosen.  20 
 
where εit = vit – uit represents the composed error term. Following Greene (2004a, 2004b, 
2005), Maximum Likelihood estimation of the model yields the coefficients β, γ, δ, φ, κ, and 
η in the frontier. A normal-half normal distribution was chosen for the error terms, and the 
parameters associated with the K
th input were calculated using the estimated parameters and 
the restrictions presented in equations (4-7). The procedure also delivers estimates of the 




2). Further, the parameter λ = σu/ σv is constructed. If λ → + ∞, the deterministic 
frontier is the result because all variation in the error term is attributed to inefficiency. 
Conversely, if λ → 0, there is no inefficiency in the disturbance, so the estimated function 
could be estimated by OLS. 
Both inputs and outputs in this estimation approach appear as regressors in the distance 
function. Thus, concerns about a possible simultaneous equation bias might arise: When 
working with an input distance function, outputs should be treated as exogeneous and inputs 
are endogenous. However, Coelli and Perelman (1996) argued that, as a consequence of the 
normalization by the K
th input, only input ratios will appear as regressors. These may be 
assumed to be exogeneous, as the input distance function is defined for radial contraction of 
all inputs, given the output level; hence, by definition, the input ratios are held constant for 
each firm. Another problem discussed in connection with the application of distance functions 
is the possible correlation of the explanatory variables with the composite error term, which 
would signify a violation of one of the basic assumptions of the stochastic frontier model. 
However, Coelli (2000) showed that this may not be a problem for Cobb-Douglas and 
translog specifications. 
4.3 Estimation of Technical Cost and Profit Efficiency 
The estimation approach presented here does not allow direct observation of the inefficiency 
measure uit because the estimation procedure delivers only an estimate of the composite error 
term  εit  = vit – uit. Thus, the efficiency scores are estimated following the procedure by 
Jondrow et al. (1982), who used the conditional distribution of u, given the error term ε. For 
the normal half-normal model, a point estimator of technical cost efficiency is given by   
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Technical cost efficiency (TCE) per firm and year may then be calculated as  
TCEit = [exp(-uit)].   (11) 
We now turn to the derivation of profit efficiency according to Kumbakhar (2006). Our 
study analyzes the reaction of German life insurers to the changes in the market environment 
that resulted from liberalization. In so doing, the study also accounts for possible changes in 
the firms’ profit efficiency as a consequence of the firms’ increasing price-setting power 
arising from offering superior services or innovations, as explained in section 3. Thus, the 
standard neoclassical profit function that assumes given input and output prices may not apply 
in this case. Humphrey and Pulley (1997) suggested a nonstandard (alternative) profit 
function (NSPF) that allowed for imperfect output markets.  
P (w,y) = py – wx,  (12) 
where w is a vector of input prices (w = w1,…,wK), p is the price for the output y, P is a firm’s 
profits, and the remaining variables are as explained above. 
In this approach, output prices are assumed to be endogenous and are determined from the 
pricing opportunity set. Thus, the NSPF in equation (12) is expressed as a function of output 
quantities and prices, not of output and input prices, as in the standard neoclassical case. 
However, Kumbakhar and Lovell (2000) pointed out that the NSPF does not satisfy 
theoretical foundations, as the optimal prices which are derived from the pricing opportunity 
set are not related to the production technology. Thus, the cost of production is not considered 
when determining optimal output prices. Kumbakhar (2006) suggested a new approach to 
determine a firm’s profits and profit efficiency under the assumption of non-competitive 
output markets. 
Kumbakhars analysis departs from the fact that, in both the NSPF and the cost function, w 
and y are the arguments in the function. The only difference between the functions is in the 
left-hand side of the equations: In the NSPF, profit (revenue minus cost) forms the left-hand 
side, whereas in the cost function, it is cost. 
 wx   y) (w,   C wx  - py      y) (w,   P = ⇔ =  (13) 
As can be seen from the equation (13), the NSPF can be transformed easily into a standard 
cost function by subtracting revenues and multiplying the function by -1. Thus, a standard 
cost function may be also used to calculate profit efficiency of a firm as follows: 
0 u   C =  represents the product of firm’s actual costs C and the technical efficiency score   
TE = exp(-uit), i.e., minimum costs. In Kumbhakar (2006), u was obtained from the estimation 22 
 
of a cost function. However, Kumbhakar assumed allocative efficiency, so u represented 
input-oriented technical inefficiency. Kumbhakar noted:  “In our formulation u is input-
oriented technical inefficiency (percentage over-use of all inputs). Therefore, it is also the 
percentage by which cost is increased….” (p. 254). 
In our study, we modify Kumbakhar’s approach by deriving uit from the estimation of an 
input distance function, as it has been presented in equation (10). We likewise assume that all 
firms act allocatively efficient.  
As all inputs used in this study represent monetary costs, minimum costs may be calculated 
as: 
0   u 








kit x  [exp(-uit)],   (14) 
and actual costs as: 
C




kit x ,   (15) 
where all variables are as presented before, the superscript D indicates that the distance 
function approach is used to calculate minimum and actual costs. 
Profit efficiency is defined as the ratio between a firm’s actual profits  ) y) (w, π ˆ ( u and the 
maximum attainable profits  ) y) (w, π ˆ ( 0     u = . Actual profits are determined as: 
C   - py      ) y) (w, π ˆ ( u =
D, (16) 
And maximum attainable profits are calculated by  
0   u 
D
0   u    C   - py    ) y) (w, π ˆ ( = = = . (17) 
Finally, profit efficiency is calculated as: 
1. PE   -   ;
) y) (w, π ˆ (
  ) y) (w, π ˆ (
PE
0   u
u ≤ ≤ ∞ =
=
  (18) 
A fully profit-efficient firm shows a profit efficiency of 1. As profits can turn negative, profit 
efficiency is not bounded below by 0, but can turn negative (zero) if actual profits are 
negative (zero).
6 Further, the measure would be undefined if the maximum attainable profit in 
an industry were negative (e.g., Banker and Maindiratta, 1988). 
                                                 
6 We decided not to remove firms which exhibit negative profits from the sample, as it is possible that firms 
incur short-term losses but are able to establish themselves solidly in the market in the long run. This is 
especially true for young firms which enter the market and incur high initial investments. Our sample contains a 23 
 
4.4 Measurement of TFP Growth and Efficiency Change 
The traditional approach to TFP measurement equates technical change with the percentage 
growth in TFP. According to this traditional Divisia approach (Solow, 1957), TFP growth is 
calculated as: 
. TC     x
C
x w
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   (19) 
All variables are as presented before, F is an aggregated measure of input usage, TC 
represents technical change, and rates of change are denoted with a dot over the variable. 
Equation (19) only holds under restrictive assumptions, i.e., there are constant returns to scale, 
neutral technical change, and perfect competition in both output and input markets (e.g., 
Baltagi and Griffin, 1988). Further, it is assumed that all firms act efficiently overall, which is 
unrealistic in most cases. Thus, recent work decomposes TFP change into different sources, 
including technical change, technical and allocative efficiency change, and scale efficiency 
change (e.g., Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000; Orea, 2002). Coelli et al. (2003) applied the 
decomposition of TFP change to the input distance frontier case such that the log of the TFP 
change between periods t and t +1 for the i
th firm is calculated as: 
) y ln y (ln  )] ε (SF ) ε [(SF   0,5
t)] / D ln ( t) / D ln [(   0,5 ) /TCE (TCE ln  ) /TFP (TFP ln 
it 1  t i 1  t i 1  t i it it
1  t i it it 1  t i it 1  t i
− ⋅ + +
∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ + =
+ + +
+ + +  (20) 
The three terms on the right-hand side of equation (20) represent technical cost efficiency 
change, technical change and scale efficiency change, respectively. Technical cost efficiency 
change is easily calculated by taking the log of the ratio between the technical cost efficiency 
scores for a given firm i in periods t+1 and t. 
The technical change measure represents the mean of the technical change measures, 
which are calculated at the period t and period t+1 data points with the distance frontier:  
1  t i 1 1  t ki
K
1 k
k 11 1 1  t i y ln  x ln  t t / lnD   + +
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number of young firms which entered the market after the liberalization of the German insurance market in 
1994. As we found very few firms showing only small negative profit efficiency scores, and none of these with 
negative profit efficiency scores over the whole observation period, the impact on the market-wide profit 
efficiency scores is rather small. 24 
 
The third summand in equation (20) measures the change in scale efficiency. For it, 
production elasticities are calculated at each data point for both periods:
7  
t ln x y ln  y ln / D ln ε 1
K
1 k
1  t ki k 1  t i 11 1 1  t i 1  t i 1  t i κ δ β β + ∑ + + = ∂ ∂ =
=
+ + + + +  (23) 
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 (24) 
The scale factors SFit are calculated as:  
SFit = (εit +1),   (25) 
where εit equals the negative of the standard returns to scale elasticity (RTS).  
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Thus, if constant returns to scale prevail, εit equals –1, RTS equals 1, and the scale efficiency 
change equals 0. Thus, increasing returns to scale are represented by values of   
RTS > 1, and decreasing returns to scale by RTS < 1. 
Finally, profit efficiency change (PEC) is calculated by taking the log of the ratio between 
the profit efficiency scores for a given firm i in periods t+1 and t: 
PEC = ln (PEi t+1/PEit). (27) 
5 Data Set and Variables 
5.1 Data Set 
The data used in this study are taken from periodically published insurance industry reports 
and insurers’ income statements for the years 1995-2002 (Hoppenstedt, 1997-2004). Since 
Hoppenstedt registers every licensed insurance firm in Germany, the database contains also 
information about firms that do not actively participate in the insurance market. We eliminate 
firms which had not delivered any information at all; firms which showed negative 
observations for inputs or outputs; firms which operated only in very specialized product 
niches, offering products only to a very specialized customer base (e.g., civil servants, 
doctors); and firms which offered only single, specialized insurance products (e.g., 
exclusively term-life insurance) because they are not representative of the industry as a whole. 
                                                 
7 We assume that firms are allocatively efficient. Thus, the additional component of TFP change which accounts 
for changes in allocative efficiency is left out of this study. 25 
 
In the end, our data set accounts for approximately 90 percent of the total premium income of 
the industry. We use an unbalanced panel in order to account for developments in efficiency/ 
TFP growth caused by newcomers in the industry and by market exits, which would not be 
included in a balanced panel. Hence, a balanced panel containing only firms which were 
active over the whole observation period could bias our results. 
Table 1 displays information about the number of firms in each year of the observation 
period (n), and presents two different measures of market concentration: C 5 represents the 
market share of the top five life insurance firms, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration 
index (HHI) measures market concentration by the sum of squared market shares of all firms.  
[Table 1 about here] 
The number of life insurance firms increased in the beginning of the observation period as 
a result of market entries arising out of market liberalization. From 1998 on, the number of 
firms in the market decreased, mainly because of M&A activities in the market. Cummins and 
Weiss (2004) analyzed the M&A activities in the European insurance markets for the 
observation period 1990-2002 and found that German insurance firms were the targets in 126 
deals involving a change in control and the acquirer in 167 cases. The high level of M&A 
activities and the corresponding market consolidation is also reflected in the development of 
the measures of market concentration: Both the C 5-measure and the HHI initially decrease as 
a consequence of market liberalization and entry of new firms, then increase again towards 
the end of the observation period. At the end of the observation period, the HHI measure 
reaches an even higher value than at the beginning of the observation period, indicating that 
the market consolidation effect outweighed the competition-enhancing effect of market 
liberalization.  
5.2 Variables 
Using SFA requires identifying the relevant inputs and outputs of an insurance firm. 
However, a review of the literature does not show clear consensus on a single input/output 
specification. This study uses the value-added approach, which is common in the literature 
(e.g., Cummins and Weiss, 2000). In using this approach, we define the services provided by 
insurers before choosing suitable output proxies. These services can be split into three major 
groups: risk-bearing/risk-pooling services, “real” financial services related to insured losses, 
and intermediation services. Following the value-added approach, then, the output of a life 
insurance company is defined in our study as follows: 26 
 
We approximate the risk-bearing function by using incurred benefits, net of reinsurance. 
Incurred benefits are payments received by policyholders in the current year, which can be 
seen as proxies for the risk-bearing/risk-pooling function because they measure the amount of 
funds distributed to the policyholders as compensation for incurred losses. The funds received 
by insurers that are not needed for benefit payments and expenses are added to policyholder 
reserves; so additions to reserves are a suitable proxy for the intermediation function of the 
insurer. We include bonuses and rebates into our output measure because these funds benefit 
the policyholders. By choosing incurred benefits net of reinsurance and the additions to 
reserves as output proxies, we follow the majority of life insurance studies (e.g., Meador et 
al., 1997; Cummins and Zi, 1998; Fenn at al., 2008). All three output measures are correlated 
with real services provided by life insurers. Because of limited data availability, it is not 
possible to divide the output measures provided by the life insurance firms according to the 
different life insurance lines. 
Besides information about insurers’ outputs, data about the costs of an insurance firm are 
necessary in order to estimate the stochastic input distance frontier. Insurers’ inputs can be 
classified into three principal groups: labor, business services and materials, and capital. In 
most cases, physical measures for these inputs (e.g., the number of employees) are not 
available, but information about the costs an insurance firm incurs for their use is available. 
To measure insurers’ costs, we choose acquisition and administration expenses, which sum to 
equal operating expenses, as a proxy for the insurers’ inputs for labor and business services 
(e.g., Cummins and Zi, 1998), since administration and acquisition expenses contain the 
insurers’ expenses for labor and business services.  
The consideration of financial capital is also important in the case of insurance firms.
8 
Insurance studies frequently use financial equity capital but seldom use financial debt. Equity 
capital is used as an input because insurance is viewed as risky debt (e.g., Cummins and 
Danzon, 1997). With this approach, insurance premiums are discounted in the market to 
account for the insurer’s default risk. This study follows the majority of extant insurance 
studies by using statutory policyholders’ surplus as a proxy for financial equity capital. To 
measure the cost of equity, financial equity capital should be valued according to the firm-
specific price for equity capital. (For an overview of the different approaches to measuring the 
                                                 
8 Some studies also include physical capital as an input measure (e.g., Meador et al., 1997) but, in general, the 
amount of physical capital used by insurance firms is comparatively small. We checked for the influence of 
physical capital by including capital expenses into our analysis, but the estimated coefficient has a very small 
value. Thus, the influence on the obtained results is very small, with all the outcomes remaining largely 
unchanged. To avoid an unnecessary loss of degrees of freedom in the estimation, we decided to leave the 
variable out of the estimation. 27 
 
cost of equity, see Cummins and Weiss, 2000.) Because of limited data availability and the 
small influence of the different approaches on the efficiency results found in other studies, we 
assume identical prices for equity capital over all firms in a given year. Equity costs are then 
obtained by valuing statutory policyholders’ surplus with the price for equity capital in a 
given year. The average price for equity capital in the industry is obtained by calculating the 
average return on the book value of equity for the industry in a given year. Similar approaches 
can be found in the literature, as when Fenn et al. (2008) used a rate of interest variable from 
long-term government bond rates as a proxy for the price of capital, and Cummins and Rubio-
Misas (2006) used the rate of total return of the most important Spanish Stock Exchange as a 
proxy for the price of equity capital for every year in their observation period. As the rate of 
total return of the most important German Stock Exchange (DAX) showed negative values in 
some of the observation years because of the stock market crash in the year 2000, we prefer to 
use the average return on the book value of equity as a proxy for the price of equity. The 
return on the book value of equity has been used before by Cummins and Weiss (1993) and 
Cummins and Sommer (1996). The latter noted that the use of market values instead of book 
values in calculating the rate of return is preferable but is limited because of the small number 
of insurers with publicly traded equity. This holds especially true for the German market, 
where only about 20 percent of the stock insurance firms are listed on the stock exchange 
(Elgeti and Maurer, 2000), and there is a significant number of mutual and public-owned 
insurance firms. Finally, the calculation of profit efficiency requires information about the 
revenues of an insurance firm. Revenues are defined as the sum of net premium income and 
investment income. Net premium income is measured by the sum of gross written premiums, 
less ceded reinsurance premiums, less the change in the provision for unearned premiums. 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis for the whole 
observation period. An analysis of the development of the single variables over time reveals 
that the output of the industry increased by approximately 68 percent over time, while 
operating expenses increased by approximately 97 percent, and equity costs slightly decreased 
from 1995 to 2002. On average, industry revenues more than doubled. 
[Table 2 about here]  28 
 
6 Results 
In this section we present the results of estimating the stochastic input distance frontier and 
the results of calculating TFP growth and changes in efficiency. We start with a discussion of 
the parameter estimates in section 6.1, while section 6.2 analyzes the development of TFP 
growth and efficiency change over time. 
6.1 Estimation Results 
The data described in section 5 was used in the panel estimation of the stochastic distance 
function described in section 4. The ML parameter estimates for the function are listed in 
table 3. All the estimated coefficients are statistically significant and show the expected signs. 
Concerning the overall evaluation of the model, the λ coefficient is significantly different 
from zero, indicating that inefficiency effects are significant in the stochastic frontier model. 
Therefore, it would be an inappropriate representation of the data if we estimated a model 
without the assumption of inefficiency. The Wald-Chi-Squared test of the overall significance 
of the model also proves highly significant. We finally analyzed whether the chosen translog 
specification is appropriate by testing it against a Cobb-Douglas functional form. Unlike a 
Cobb-Douglas specification, the translog specification contains the second-order and cross-
term coefficients. Our likelihood ratio (LR) test strongly rejects the hypothesis that the Cobb-
Douglas function fits the data better, so we conclude that the translog specification is 
appropriate. We further test whether the assumption of technical change is appropriate; the 
hypothesis of no technical change is rejected based on the results of the LR test, so we 
conclude that the incorporation of a time trend is adequate. 
[Table 3 about here] 
We now turn to the estimates of the input elasticities in table 4.3. The estimate of 0.484 for 
the operating expenses shows the expected sign and is highly significant. The coefficient for 
the second input, equity costs, is calculated via the homogeneity restriction presented in 
section 4.4, and amounts to 0.516.  
The estimated parameters also provide information on scale economies and technical 
change. The first order coefficient of the output variable (β1) is less than one in absolute 
value, indicating increasing returns to scale for the industry at the sample mean. We tested the 
assumption of constant returns to scale in the industry by applying a Wald test, and the 
hypothesis of constant returns to scale is strongly rejected, confirming our theory that, on 29 
 
average, German life insurers operate under increasing returns to scale, i.e., firms are able to 
reduce costs by increasing firm size. 
The first-order coefficient of the time trend variable (η1) estimates the technical change 
over time; the positive sign of the coefficient indicates that there has been positive technical 
change in the industry during the observation period. The quadratic time trend (η11) shows a 
weakly significant positive sign, indicating technical change growing at an increasing rate 
during the observation period. These results already indicate that hypothesis 3 cannot be 
rejected because the industry experienced positive technical change, resulting in potential 
savings for the firms. Further, the coefficient of the cross term of operating expenses and the 
time trend (φ1) is negative and highly significant, indicating non-neutral technical change 
(e.g., Färe et al., 1997, and Sipiläinen, 2007, for an application in a distance function 
estimation framework). The elasticity with respect to operating expenses decreases over time, 
indicating labor-saving technical change. This is according to our expectations, as the 
improvements in information technologies were mainly labor-saving. Correspondingly, the 
coefficient of equity costs with respect to time is calculated via the homogeneity restrictions 
and amounts to 0.02. Thus, the elasticity with respect to equity costs increases slightly over 
time. 
6.2 Efficiency Levels, TFP Change and Profit Efficiency Change 
Table 4 is a summary of the technical cost efficiency measures obtained from estimating the 
stochastic distance function, and the profit efficiency estimates calculated in a second step, 
following Kumbakhar (2006). Results are presented as yearly average values and as mean 
values over the whole sample. 
[Table 4 about here] 
The yearly results give an initial insight into the development of technical cost and profit 
efficiency. As far as the mean values of technical cost efficiency are concerned, no clear trend 
emerges for the observation period; the average value over the whole observation period is 
67.78 percent, with the efficiency scores for the single years ranging from 65.05 percent in 
1999 to 70.54 percent in 2001. Mean profit efficiency over the whole observation period adds 
up to 91.37 percent. There seems to be an upward trend in the development of profit 
efficiency over time, although the standard deviation of the mean efficiency scores for the 
single years is quite large, indicating significant variations in the profit efficiency of single 
firms. Thus, the decomposition of TFP growth into its components and the analysis of profit 
efficiency change provide a more detailed analysis of productivity change in the industry. 30 
 
Table 5 reports the results for the single periods and as mean values over the whole sample. 
The calculation of TFP components and changes in profit efficiency in the last line of the 
table compare the beginning and ending years of the sample period, 1995 and 2002, so the 
results in this line contain only those firms which were active during the whole observation 
period. The comparison of these results with the mean values delivers some interesting 
differences. We start with a discussion of the reported mean values delivered by year-to-year 
comparisons. 
The mean value reported for the TFP change measure is 12.503, so the average annual 
change of TFP in this period is 12.50 percent. The single components of this TFP change 
measure are the center of interest of this study, as the decomposition of TFP into technical 
change and efficiency change allows us to differentiate between a shift of the frontier 
(technical change), a movement towards the frontier (efficiency change), and a movement 
along the frontier (scale efficiency change). We start with the development of technical 
change (TC), and focus afterwards on the development of technical cost efficiency (TCEC) 
and scale efficiency change (SEC). Finally, we analyze profit efficiency change (PEC). 
As can be seen from table 5, German life insurance firms experienced significant positive 
technical change during the observation period. On average, over the observation period, the 
industry benefited from cost reductions of 7.019 percent resulting from pure technical change, 
which slightly increased over time. Thus, our hypothesis 4 is confirmed: Improvements in 
information technologies and connected innovations in communication and distribution 
services of insurance firms have led to significant technological progress in the industry. The 
liberalization of the market may have induced firms to adopt technological innovations and 
thereby caused positive technical change. The large effect of positive technical change may 
also explain why the majority of German life insurance firms continue to operate under 
increasing returns to scale; large fixed costs in conjunction with investments in information 
technologies may result in an increase in the optimal size of the firm (e.g., Cummins et al., 
1999). 
No clear trend in the development of technical cost efficiency can be deduced from the 
results. Technical cost efficiency increased for three years of the observation period, but the 
industry also experienced significant decreases in technical cost efficiency in three years of 
the observation period, leading to a small negative mean value (-0.353 percent) over the 
whole period. Table 5 shows that profit efficiency remained more stable than technical cost 
efficiency; only modest changes were observed during the observation period, resulting in an 
average change close to zero (0.361 percent). From these results, we conclude that hypothesis 31 
 
1 must be rejected; there was no clear upward trend in the development of technical cost and 
profit efficiency in the German life insurance industry.  
We conclude that potential competition as a consequence of market liberalization has not 
resulted in technical cost and profit efficiency increases. We find no clear evidence for 
hypothesis 2, as profit efficiency levels remained much more stable compared to technical 
cost efficiency, and we find only a small increase in the average value over the whole 
observation period, while technical cost efficiency slightly decreased. However, the effects 
are far too small to indicate that firms realized significant gains in profit efficiency resulting 
from cost-increasing innovations. Further, there is no evidence of negative correlation 
between changes in technical cost efficiency and profit efficiency; on the contrary, in two of 
the three years in which technical cost efficiency decreased, profit efficiency also decreased. 
Firms have realized important increases in scale efficiency, as the industry experienced a 
significant positive scale efficiency of 5.837 percent on average. The first years, from   
1997-2000, showed significant positive scale efficiency changes, while the last two years 
showed a negative contribution of scale efficiency change to TFP growth. Increasing returns 
to scale are found for the sample mean and for all single years. The negative scale efficiency 
change in the last two years may be explained by decreases in output, which may have been a 
consequence of the bursting of the dotcom bubble and the stock market crash in 2000. 
Overall, hypothesis 3 cannot be rejected because market liberalization and subsequent market 
consolidation have led to positive changes in scale efficiency. By increasing firm size, partly 
as a consequence of M&A activities, firms have moved closer to their optimal size.  
The positive contribution of changes in scale efficiency to TFP growth may partially 
explain why technical cost and profit efficiency have not increased significantly. The 
descriptive results indicate that market concentration increased again after an initial decrease 
as a reaction to market liberalization. Thus, firms may have reacted to increasing competition 
primarily by realizing scale economies. This, in turn, may have decreased competition again 
and consequently lowered efficiency-enhancing incentives of the firms. This explanation may 
be supported by the fact that foreign insurers have entered the German market through M&A 
with German firms, while the establishment of foreign branches and agencies, as well as 
direct cross-border trade, remains limited (Beckmann et al., 2002). This indicates that market 
liberalization, which was meant to increase competition, may have resulted in higher market 
concentration, as remaining barriers to entry make it difficult for foreign insurers to enter the 
market via cross-border trade or the establishment of agencies or branches. Weill (2004) and 
Casu and Girardone (2006) found a similar effect in the U.S. and the European banking 32 
 
markets, i.e., that the deregulation and liberalization of the banking markets forced banks to 
be more efficient. (In our study, firms mainly increase their scale efficiency.) However, as a 
second step, the most efficient banks increased their market share and, thus, the market 
became more concentrated. The authors concluded that the liberalization of the markets has 
thus not resulted in more competitive markets.  
A second reason for the co-incidence of unchanged technical cost and profit efficiency 
with increased scale efficiency may be found in large post-merger integration costs, especially 
as a consequence of cross-border mergers (e.g., Rhoades, 1998). In that case, the detrimental 
effect on efficiency would be transitory, leading to an increase in technical cost and profit 
efficiency once the integration process has finished. 
In comparing the first and last year of the observation period, i.e., those which include only 
those firms which remained in the market throughout the whole observation period, we find 
very similar results concerning technical cost efficiency change, which decreased by only 
0.214 percent. This suggests that firms which were active during the whole observation period 
did not increase their cost efficiency, either. However, profit efficiency change is positive for 
those firms, although the effect is relatively small: Profit efficiency increased by 1.518 
percent between 1995 and 2002. This finding provides at least some evidence for hypothesis 2 
holding true, since those firms which remained in the market during the whole observation 
period increased profit efficiency, though not in cost efficiency. This may indicate that those 
firms have realized service and product innovations which increased revenues by more than 
they raised costs. Finally, the scale efficiency effect is much stronger for those firms (24.265 
percent), possibly because it was mainly these firms which acquired other life insurers over 
the observation period, thus increasing their size and realizing important gains in scale 
efficiency.  
7 Conclusions 
This study analyzed the effects of liberalization of the European insurance industry on the 
German life insurance market. The Third European Life Insurance Directives exposed 
European life insurance markets to cross-border competition. In the case of the heavily 
regulated German life insurance market, former price and product regulation was abolished. 
These major changes were implemented to increase the efficiency of the industry by 
enhancing competition.  33 
 
This study tested several hypotheses by analyzing TFP growth in the German life 
insurance industry for the years 1995-2002 and decomposing it into its sources – technical 
cost efficiency change, technical change, and scale efficiency change. We applied a stochastic 
distance frontier panel approach to derive estimates of technical cost efficiency and, following 
a recent approach by Greene (2005), we accounted for firm-specific heterogeneity by 
estimating a true fixed effects model. Further, we estimated changes in profit efficiency 
following Kumbakhar (2006), as the underlying non-standard profit function allows for price-
setting power of firms which may have occurred as a consequence of market liberalization. 
We found evidence for positive TFP growth in the German life insurance industry over the 
observation period, but the decomposition of TFP growth reveals that positive technical 
change is the main driver of positive TFP growth. Thus, we concluded that hypothesis 4 may 
not be rejected. These results were confirmed by Hussels and Ward (2004), who found 
positive technical change in the German life insurance industry for the period 1991-2002, 
although to a smaller extent. Their results must be treated cautiously, as the authors included 
yearly data of only 31 life insurance firms in their calculations.  
Technical cost efficiency did not increase during the observation period, indicating that 
firms have experienced small efficiency losses over the observation period. These results are 
broadly in line with existing studies on the German market; Hussels and Ward (2004) found 
comparable changes in cost efficiency for the same observation period, while Mahlberg and 
Url (2007) reported a modest positive change in technical efficiency for the whole German 
industry, and Fenn et al. (2008) found that mean cost efficiency of German life insurers 
remained largely unchanged after liberalization. We also found that profit efficiency remains 
largely unchanged, so hypothesis 1 must be rejected. The aims of the liberalization process to 
increase market efficiency significantly were not reached until 2002, which may be partly 
explained by post-merger integration and transaction costs. We find no clear evidence for 
hypothesis 2 holding true, because only those firms which were active during the whole 
observation period realized small improvements in profit efficiency. 
Scale efficiency has increased on average, as was hypothesized. Market consolidation in 
the presence of scale economies leads to efficiency gains as the firms move closer to their 
optimal size. By estimating firm-specific scale elasticity, we found that increasing returns to 
scale prevailed for the majority of the firms over the whole sample. These results are 
confirmed by previous literature; Mahlberg and Url (2007) reported large improvements in 
scale efficiency for the whole German insurance industry, and Fenn et al. (2008) also found 
increasing returns to scale prevailing in the German life insurance industry.  34 
 
This significant increase in scale efficiency, taken together with the descriptive measures 
of market concentration, which indicate that market concentration increased again towards the 
end of the observation period, leads to an interesting conclusion: The liberalization of the 
European financial markets aimed at increasing competition and the efficiency of the markets. 
However, the increase in (potential) competition primarily provided incentives for the firms to 
realize economies of scale, mainly through M&A activities. This market consolidation may, 
in turn, reduce competition and efficiency-enhancing incentives. Fenn et al. (2008) drew a 
similar conclusion in finding that gains in scale efficiency of European insurance firms are 
linked with increasing X-inefficiencies. 
Our work represents a twofold contribution to the existing literature. First, it contributes to 
the existing research on the development of European insurance markets after the 
liberalization of the market and, in doing so, is the first study to disentangle TFP growth into 
its three components for the German life insurance industry. The study used a recent approach 
for estimating stochastic frontiers by Greene (2005). The present study is also the first study 
to incorporate changes in profit efficiency into the analysis by applying an approach by 
Kumbakhar (2006) which allows for the price-setting power of firms.  
The results indicate that the intended effects of the European financial market liberalization 
have only partially been achieved in the German life insurance market. It seems that 
increasing market consolidation as a reaction to market liberalization, in combination with 
still-existent barriers to entry, may reduce competition again as a feedback effect. However, 
this paper aims to analyze the effects of market liberalization on the performance of the 
industry, so a detailed analysis of the relationship between efficiency, and the structure and 
performance of the market is beyond the scope of this paper. As a task for future research, 
these central hypotheses which link market structure and performance should be tested for the 
German insurance market. 35 
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Table 1: Number of Firms and Measures of Market Concentration, 1995-2002 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
n  94 97 89 96 95 92 83 84 
C 5  34.29 33.71 32.94 33.34 31.44 31.80 32.70 32.74 
HHI  440.46 426.60 408.44 418.11 414.13 403.12 448.56 458.20 
Note: C 5 and HHI are presented in percent. Market share is measured by premium income. 
Source: Own calculations. 42 
 
Table 2: Variables and Summary Statistics, 1995-2002 
Note: All variables are expressed in 2000 Thousand Euro units deflated with the German Consumer Price Index. 
Source: Own calculations.
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Table 3: Translog Input Distance Function – Estimation Results 
True Fixed Effects Model 
Dependent variable: -(ln(Equity costs)) 
Variable Parameter  Coefficients  Standard  Error 
Ln(Opex)  γ1  0.484*** 0.011 
Ln(Output)  β1  -0.768*** 0.010 
Time  η1  0.060*** 0.003 
½ (ln(Opex))
2  γ11  0.079*** 0.015 
Ln(Opex)*ln(Output)  δ1  0.011** 0.005 
Ln(Opex)*time  φ1  -0.024*** 0.004 
½ (ln(Output)
2  β11  -0.132*** 0.002 
Ln(Output)*time  κ1  0.008*** 0.002 
½ (time*time)  η11  0.007** 0.002 
Variance parameters     
σ    0.797*** 0.010 
σ u (one-sided)    0.774  
σ v (symmetric)    0.190  
λ = σu/ σv   4.065***  0.193 
Log Likelihood function    -184.81   
Wald test statistic (χ
2) 
(H0: No influence of exogenous variables) 
 8885.85***   
LR test 
(H0: Cobb-Douglas) 
 222.01***   
LR test 
(H0: No technical change) 
 13.535**   
Wald test statistic (χ
2) 
(H0: CRS) 
 519.98***   
Note: **: significant at a 5 percent level; ***: significant at at 1 percent level; Estimated with “LIMDEP 9.0”. 
Source: Own estimations. 44 
 
Table 4: Average Technical Cost and Profit Efficiency, 1995-2002 




















































Source: Own estimations. 
 
















1995/96  4.031 5.429  12.715  22.175  0.017 
1996/97  5.022 -2.304  12.066  14.784 1.088 
1997/98  6.017 3.581 6.219  15.817  1.703 
1998/99  7.081 -7.616 5.108 4.574 -2.402 
1999/2000  7.762 2.364 6.030  16.159  1.445 
2000/01  9.186 5.267 -1.604  12.849  2.063 
2001/02  10.605 -9.408 -1.122  0.075  -1.535 
Total  7.019 -0.353 5.837 12.503 0.361 
1995-2002 
1  7.289 -0.214  24.265  31.339 1.518 
Note: All measures are in percentage terms. 
1 Calculation of TFP components and profit efficiency change for 
1995 versus 2002. 
Source: Own calculations. 